Situation report for West Africa and Sahel, February 2025

BURKINA FASO: JNIM Attacks Persist, Civilian Targeting Intensifies

In February, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) carried out sustained attacks across Burkina Faso, targeting security forces and civilians. Key incidents included assaults in Djibo (Sahel region), Tanwalbougou (East region), and Bango (North region), with significant casualties among soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) members. The group also escalated attacks on civilians, killing healthcare workers and displacing communities in Boucle du Mouhoun.

A notable development was JNIM's seizure of a Burkina Faso Armed Forces (FDS) checkpoint in Bango, suggesting a push for territorial control and disruption of security force operations. Additionally, clashes with Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) in Oudalan Province highlighted ongoing militant competition.

The kidnapping of an UN-affiliated NGO worker and the burglary of a UN facility in the North region underscored security risks for humanitarian operations. Overall, JNIM's actions reinforced its strategy of destabilizing state control, particularly along Burkina Faso’s borders with Mali and Niger.

Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau: Disputed Mandate and Expulsion of ECOWAS Mediation Mission

Guinea-Bissau is facing political turmoil as President Umaro Sissoco Embaló's tenure remains a point of contention. He insists he will stay in power until a new president is elected, despite opposition claims that his mandate ended on 27 February 2025.

An ECOWAS mediation mission arrived in February to help set election dates, but Embaló expelled them on 1 March, accusing them of overstepping their role. Initially, he scheduled elections for 30 November 2025, but later moved them to 23 November, further deepening opposition distrust.

Opposition groups PAI-Terra Ranka and API-Cabas Garandi boycotted election discussions and called for nationwide protests on 27 February, though a heavy security deployment largely suppressed them.

The dispute stems from the 2019 presidential elections, where results were contested, and Embaló took power in February 2020 before the Supreme Court officially recognized his victory in September 2020. The opposition argues his five-year term should have ended in February 2025, while the Supreme Court—whose independence has been questioned—ruled his mandate extends until new elections are held.

Further complicating matters, Embaló dissolved Parliament in December 2023 after an alleged coup attempt, later postponing elections indefinitely. He initially stated he wouldn’t run for re-election but has since reversed course and confirmed his candidacy.

Security forces remain divided, with the National Guard aligned with Parliament and the military loyal to the President. Guinea-Bissau’s history of military coups and political instability raises concerns about the country’s stability as tensions escalate ahead of the elections.

Mali: Ongoing Security Crisis

Mali is facing escalating violence due to attacks by militant groups, including the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). These groups continue to carry out ambushes, village raids, and economic blockades, particularly in the regions of Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu, Mopti, and Ségou. The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have launched counterterrorism operations but are struggling to secure contested areas.

ISSP has been actively targeting transportation routes, with a major ambush on February 7 near Gao, where a convoy of commercial and public transport vehicles, escorted by FAMa, was attacked, resulting in casualties and material losses. This led to a temporary strike by the Gao transport union, which halted operations along a key trade route until negotiations allowed them to resume on February 10. ISSP also continues to disrupt economic activity by hijacking trucks, enforcing evacuations in villages, and reinforcing its control over key transit routes. On February 18, a former UN staff member was abducted along a major road by suspected ISSP members and later released after his captors engaged with his family, with reports suggesting a ransom was paid.

Meanwhile, JNIM has intensified its attacks across northern and central Mali, targeting civilians, local leaders, and security forces. The group carried out multiple assassinations, abductions, and forced displacements, particularly in the regions of Timbuktu, Mopti, and Ségou. Government officials have also become primary targets, with JNIM ambushing a convoy carrying the Minister of Higher Education near Niéna on February 13 and later attacking a convoy transporting the Minister of Sanitation on February 27, resulting in casualties and vehicle destruction.

FAMa has responded with airstrikes against ISSP and JNIM in several regions, attempting to curb their influence. However, concerns have been raised about military conduct, particularly regarding the deaths of civilians during a February 17 attack in Gao. Authorities have since launched an investigation into the incident following allegations of military involvement.

Regional security challenges remain a major obstacle in combating these extremist groups, as ISSP and JNIM exploit Mali’s porous borders to evade military pressure, resupply, and relocate fighters. In response, Mali and Senegal initiated joint patrols on February 22, while the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) announced a plan to deploy a 5,000-strong force in the Liptako-Gourma area. However, diplomatic tensions with Mauritania and Algeria continue to complicate regional security cooperation, limiting the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts.

The ongoing insecurity is severely affecting trade, humanitarian aid, and military operations. The instability along major transportation routes threatens economic stability, while increased violence and forced displacements have worsened humanitarian conditions. As JNIM and ISSP adapt their tactics, using roadside bombs, abductions, and targeted killings, the Malian government faces a growing challenge in restoring stability and protecting its citizens. Without stronger regional cooperation and more effective military strategies, extremist groups will likely continue to expand their influence and disrupt state authority.

Security and Political Developments in Niger

Ongoing Extremist Threats
Terrorist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continue to carry out deadly attacks on security forces and civilians, particularly in Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa. ISSP has targeted military positions and supply routes, including ambushing soldiers and seizing weapons. JNIM expanded its operations into previously less-affected regions, such as Agadez and Dosso. Diffa has seen a surge in kidnappings and clashes between rival extremist groups, ISWAP and JAS, fueling instability.

Crime and Smuggling Networks
Security forces intensified efforts against drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, and armed robberies, especially in Tahoua and Maradi. Cross-border criminal activities, including cattle rustling and attacks on financial institutions, remain significant threats. Criminal elements from Nigeria continue to exploit Niger’s porous borders, reinforcing extremist financing and instability.

Political Transition and Governance
Niger’s military-led government concluded a National Assises in February, recommending a five-year transition period with potential revisions based on security conditions. Key decisions include the dissolution of political parties, amnesty for coup leaders, and allowing ruling officials to run in future elections. General Abdourahmane Tchiani was promoted to a five-star general, and Islam was officially recognized as the majority religion. While CNSP supporters back these measures, concerns remain over democratic governance, political inclusivity, and rule of law.

Implications and Future Risks
Persistent extremist attacks strain Niger’s security forces, forcing them to counter multiple threats across different regions. The expansion of JNIM into Agadez and ISSP’s continued operations in Tillabéri raise concerns about further destabilization. Organized crime and militant financing remain key challenges. Meanwhile, the prolonged military transition could impact Niger’s political stability and international relations.

Senegal Signs Peace Agreement to End Casamance Conflict

Historic Peace Deal

On February 23, Senegal’s government and the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) signed a peace agreement to end Africa’s longest-running conflict. The deal, brokered in Guinea-Bissau, focuses on disarming and reintegrating fighters from the MFDC’s southern faction, led by César Atoute Badiatte. It also includes plans to resettle displaced communities.

Background on the Casamance Conflict

The conflict began in 1982 due to economic marginalization and government repression. Over 43 years, it has caused thousands of deaths and displaced more than 50,000 people. While violence has decreased, occasional clashes continue, especially near Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.

Challenges to Lasting Peace

• Limited Scope: The agreement only includes the Badiatte faction. Other MFDC groups, especially the militant faction led by Salif Sadio, refuse to negotiate and continue fighting.
• Illegal Activities: Drug trafficking and illegal logging, key income sources for rebels, may persist, as Sadio’s faction remains active.
• Financial Constraints: Senegal’s high public debt (99.67% of GDP) and budget deficit may limit funds for development, resettlement, and demobilization efforts.
• Risk of Relapse: Without sufficient economic alternatives, former fighters may return to criminal activities, potentially leading to further clashes.

While this agreement marks progress, achieving lasting peace in Casamance remains uncertain, as key factions remain outside the deal and financial challenges loom.