From Doha to Goma – The DRC’s Deepening Crisis and the Return of Kabila

The DRC’s Deepening Crisis and the Return of Kabila

The failure of the talks held in Doha between the Congolese government and representatives of the M23/AFC confirms the deadlock of an already moribund diplomatic process. This impasse comes at a time when the balance of power on the ground clearly favours the rebellion, which continues to consolidate its military positions in North Kivu. At the same time, former president Joseph Kabila’s resurgence at the heart of the crisis reveals deep political undercurrents, calling into question both the cohesion of the current regime and the durability of the republican pact born of the 2006 transition.

African Security Analysis has received reports that multiple M23/AFC officers have acknowledged plans for large-scale offensives across several key locations, including Kindu and Kisangani. They assert that, after enduring significant hardships, their soldiers must now start receiving their overdue salaries.

Doha Process Suspended: A Symptom of Growing Mistrust

In recent days, discussions between Kinshasa and the M23/AFC have gradually broken down, continuing only through Qatari mediators. The official announcement of the failure of negotiations, made on Sunday, confirmed the withdrawal of both delegations to their respective strongholds in Kinshasa and Goma.

The talks aimed to draft a joint declaration of intent as a prelude to a ceasefire. But several obstacles prevented any consensus. The first point of contention was the very nature of the conflict: the M23/AFC insisted that its case be treated separately from the broader dispute between the DRC and Rwanda, while Kinshasa continues to view the group as a direct proxy of Kigali.

Another major sticking point was the level of interlocutors. While the M23 sent its president, Bertrand Bisimwa, Kinshasa opted for lower-ranking representatives—an affront that the Goma delegation took very badly. “The M23, which controls territory twice the size of some European countries, found this composition insulting,” said a close associate of the rebel movement.

Kinshasa’s Risky Reliance on Foreign Backing Amid Renewed Conflict

According to sources close to the Congolese presidency, President Félix Tshisekedi is showing signs of renewed confidence. This shift in posture is attributed to a surge in U.S. attention, notably after the visit of Massad Boulos and the announcement regarding the involvement of American private military contractors affiliated with Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater.

Yet this apparent support is drawing scepticism. “Kinshasa wrongly believes others will fight its battles,” said a Congolese opposition figure in exile, criticizing the lack of impact from regional forces such as ECCAS, SADC, the Romanians, and Burundians. He emphasized the looming danger in Uvira, a city just 20 minutes from Bujumbura, whose fall is being desperately resisted.

In the wake of the collapsed Doha negotiations, there’s speculation about whether Togolese mediation, led by President Faure Gnassingbé, could unite fragmented peace initiatives. That prospect seems dim. The M23 rebel group, which had attempted to de-escalate tensions by retreating from Walikale without combat, has accused Kinshasa of acting in bad faith. The government’s refusal to free 700 Swahili-speaking detainees or to drop charges against M23 leaders has only fuelled resentment. Feeling sidelined and betrayed, the group now vows to resume hostilities.

Military Dynamics Favouring the M23/AFC

Since early 2024, the Alliance of the Congo River (AFC), the political arm of the M23, has reinforced its presence in Rutshuru, Masisi, and the surroundings of Goma. Combining tactical agility, administrative integration, and control over logistical axes, the movement also benefits from discreet regional support, especially from elements of the Rwandan military.

On the government side, the FARDC struggle to maintain control, often relying on auxiliary armed groups with shifting loyalties. Despite some redeployments to strategic zones like Sake, Mweso, or Kitshanga, Kinshasa’s military strategy remains incoherent, hampered by fragmented command structures and vulnerable supply lines.

The situation is deteriorating rapidly. The M23/AFC’s withdrawal from Walikale, initially seen as a de-escalation gesture, appears to have been only a temporary pause. Recent reports indicate renewed fighting around this strategic North Kivu town, with the M23 clashing with pro-government forces, notably the Wazalendo militias and FARDC. These hostilities, following the M23’s partial withdrawal in April, highlight the fragility of the Doha-negotiated ceasefire.

If the talks definitively collapse, the M23/AFC—bolstered by its mineral resources and territorial control—could escalate its offensives, worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis.

The FARDC are actively working to block the M23’s ambitions. Major Nestor Mavudisa, spokesperson for the 3rd Defence Zone, and General Muhondosi, commander of the 34th military region, are currently stationed in Walikale. The FARDC assure that the rebels will not retake the town, a strategic stronghold for protecting Kisangani—a city reportedly in the M23/AFC’s sights.

Kabila’s Strategic Return: Catalyst for Polarization

Former president Joseph Kabila, in exile since 2023, made a striking return in April 2025 via the Rwandan border. Since then, his old military and political networks have reactivated. Alarmed by this resurgence, Kinshasa has suspended the PPRD, seized his assets, and accused him of aiding the rebels.

Officially, Kabila says he wants to help bring peace, but his presence in Goma fuels suspicions of collusion with the M23.

According to African Security Analysis, Kabila might be betting on a prolonged crisis to position himself as a fallback option to a weakened government. Some diplomats even mention discreet dealings with Asian and African powers, while his supporters actively work to undermine the current regime.

Joseph Kabila, who led the DRC from 2001 to 2019, left the country in 2023 for self-imposed exile. His return in April 2025 via Rwanda was met with hostility from Congolese authorities. The government suspended his party, the PPRD, and seized his assets, accusing him of backing the M23 and taking part in an insurrection attempt.

While Kabila claims to seek peace, his critics believe he’s manoeuvring to regain power with rebel and foreign support. His presence in Goma, an M23 stronghold, reinforces these suspicions, especially given the group’s alleged involvement in war crimes and mineral trafficking.

The DRC’s mineral wealth, including cobalt and coltan, has become a battleground for global influence. The United States, seeking to counter China’s dominance, backs Tshisekedi’s government. But Kabila’s return could threaten these efforts and deepen instability.

In a speech planned this week, Kabila is expected to call for an “African solution” to the DRC’s crisis and to denounce the presence of foreign armed forces, as well as the Nairobi and Luanda processes.

The involvement of controversial figures like Erik Prince, in securing Congolese mines raises concerns about the ethics of foreign interventions and the risk of militarizing the conflict further. If Kabila gains the support of key political and military figures, a new escalation is likely, risking further national fragmentation. Conversely, a coordinated response by the government, supported internationally, could help contain the threat and initiate stabilization.

Still, without deep institutional reform, effective anti-corruption efforts, and equitable resource management, cycles of violence are likely to continue. The DRC is at a crucial crossroads, and decisions made in the coming months will shape its political and economic future.

Toward a Disintegration of the Republican Pact?

Beyond security issues, the very foundation of the republican compromise forged at Sun City and consolidated in 2006 is cracking. The pact, which once enabled a peaceful transition and the formation of a national army, now appears emptied of meaning:

• The army remains fragmented, influenced by ethnic and patronage-based networks.
• The political system is dominated by autonomous local elites or institutionalized warlords.
• Accountability mechanisms are weak, institutions are undermined, and elections are increasingly disputed.

African Security Analysis warns that this disintegration is giving rise to parallel zones of influence, where central state sovereignty becomes merely symbolic. This breakdown may well be used as a pretext to reignite conflict.

Conclusion

African Security Analysis concludes that the collapse of the Doha negotiations, the military advances of the M23/AFC, the return of Kabila, and the erosion of the republican pact paint a grim picture. Kinshasa finds itself trapped between a determined rebellion, unreliable allies, and a dangerously polarized political climate.

Without sweeping institutional reforms, serious anti-corruption efforts, and an inclusive national strategy, the DRC risks plunging into a prolonged cycle of violence and fragmentation.

Furthermore, Kabila’s arrival in Goma—at the heart of the rebel system—risks providing the M23/AFC with significant political, logistical, and symbolic support, strengthening its legitimacy among certain elites and feeding the cycle of polarization in the country’s eastern regions.