Security Council Forecast – West Africa and the Sahel (April 2025)
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council will receive a briefing on the situation in West Africa and the Sahel. Mr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), is expected to brief members on political, security, and regional developments.
Recent Regional Developments
The political and security landscape in West Africa and the Sahel continues to evolve amid persistent threats from violent extremism, governance challenges, and growing geopolitical divides.
Withdrawal from ECOWAS and Regional Reconfiguration
On 29 January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formalised their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), following earlier announcements made in 2024. Governed by military juntas, the three countries have instead consolidated their cooperation under the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), established in 2023 as a framework for mutual defence. In March, the AES states also withdrew from the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie.
ECOWAS, at its December 2024 summit, provided a transitional window until 29 July 2025 for the AES countries to reconsider their withdrawal. It mandated its Council of Ministers to determine modalities for separation and outline future political and economic relations.
Security Trends and Terrorism
The Sahel continues to bear the brunt of global terrorist violence. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, the region accounted for over half of global terrorism-related deaths in 2024, with five Sahelian countries ranked among the world’s ten most affected. Terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaida and Islamic State continue to exploit governance deficits, intercommunal conflict, and economic hardship.
On 21 March, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants attacked a mosque in Niger’s Fambita region, killing at least 44 individuals. The Security Council strongly condemned the incident in a statement on 27 March.
The threat is expanding beyond the Sahel to coastal West Africa. In Togo, ten attacks in 2024 resulted in 52 deaths, and Benin experienced several fatal incidents, including a January 2025 assault that killed 28 soldiers. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in both countries.
Governance and Political Transitions
Democratic transitions remain fragile across the region:
- Guinea has experienced delays in its agreed roadmap to civilian governance, while plans for a constitutional referendum have heightened political tensions.
- Niger's transitional leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, was sworn in under a new charter allowing for a flexible five-year transition. All political parties have since been dissolved.
- Côte d’Ivoire faces heightened tensions ahead of its October presidential elections, following the disqualification of prominent opposition figures from the provisional voter list.
- Togo has adopted constitutional amendments converting the presidential system into a parliamentary model, consolidating President Faure Gnassingbé’s executive authority amid controversy.
- Guinea-Bissau remains in political crisis following the dissolution of its parliament in December 2023. ECOWAS-UNOWAS mediation efforts were curtailed after President Umaro Sissoco Embaló rejected external intervention, and the opposition boycotted the process.
Key Issues and Options
1. Terrorism and Regional Security Mechanisms
The expansion of terrorist activity—particularly in AES countries—remains a central concern. Terrorist groups are increasingly equipped with sophisticated weaponry, including drones, and are forging links with maritime criminal networks. The southward spread of violence risks destabilising coastal states.
Council members may wish to explore enhanced support for regional security initiatives such as the Accra Initiative and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). These mechanisms face persistent challenges in funding, coordination, and capacity—further compounded by the withdrawal of traditional military partners and a pivot toward alternative security alliances, including with Russia.
2. Political Transitions and Unconstitutional Changes of Government
The resurgence of military takeovers and delayed transitions necessitate sustained Council engagement. Structural drivers such as weak governance, underdevelopment, and climate vulnerability continue to fuel instability.
The Council may request a dedicated briefing by the Secretary-General on regional governance, drawing from the findings of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance, and Development in the Sahel (Issoufou Panel). The Panel’s final report, discussed at the 8th UN-AU annual conference in October 2024, has not yet been formally presented to Council members.
3. Terrorism–Maritime Crime Nexus and Use of Technology by Armed Groups
An informal briefing could be convened to assess the convergence of terrorist threats with maritime insecurity, the use of advanced technologies by non-state actors, and implications for regional peace and security.
4. Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns
The humanitarian crisis across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin is worsening, exacerbated by abuses committed by both state and non-state actors. The Council could use the April briefing to reaffirm the importance of compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as the protection of civic space.
Council Dynamics
While Council members are united in recognising the threats posed by terrorism and regional instability, divergences have emerged concerning responses to the political and security crises in AES countries. The United States and several European members remain critical of increasing ties between Sahelian juntas and the Russian Federation, particularly following the deepening presence of entities such as the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group).
In contrast, Russia has openly supported AES perspectives within the Council. Meanwhile, Sierra Leone and other members advocate for continued engagement and underscore the importance of regional ownership in addressing terrorism and governance challenges.
The broader geopolitical context continues to shape Council discussions. The withdrawal of French forces from Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal in late 2024 symbolised a shift in regional security paradigms. In addition, recent reports of Ukrainian involvement in a 2024 ambush on Malian and Russian forces, and the subsequent severance of diplomatic relations between AES countries and Ukraine, have added further complexity.
The collapse of Syria’s government disrupted Russia’s African logistics network, prompting a redistribution of military assets to Libya and increased deliveries of heavy weaponry to Mali’s junta. These shifts further underline the evolving geopolitical competition in the Sahel.
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Uvira Buckles Under Pressure
Nestled along the shores of Lake Tanganyika, the strategic city of Uvira now finds itself on the edge. Since early 2025, M23 rebel forces, supported by the Congo River Alliance, have gradually tightened their grip on this once-thriving hub of 726,000 residents. Once a bustling commercial centre, Uvira has become a frontline battlefield where the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), backed by local Wazalendo militias and Burundian reinforcements, are fighting a desperate rear-guard action. Amidst this turmoil, the local civilian population, caught in the crossfire, endures the heaviest toll. A Blistering Offensive The situation took a dramatic turn on February 18 when M23 forces seized Kamanyola, a locality 75 kilometres north of Uvira, inflicting a severe blow on FARDC forces and forcing them to retreat. Within 24 hours, Uvira plunged into chaos—gunfire echoed through the streets, looting erupted, and over 500 prisoners staged a dramatic escape from Mulunge prison. Faced with mounting violence, thousands of residents fled toward neighbouring Burundi or sought refuge in relatively safer towns like Kalemie and Moba, leaving behind only about 20% of the population in a city that increasingly resembles a ghost town. Internal Fractures and Fratricidal Clashes By February 25, internal discord erupted as infighting broke out between FARDC and their Wazalendo allies, resulting in 20 deaths and 60 wounded. Although the Wazalendo managed to temporarily reclaim positions such as the Kaziba chiefdom, the relentless advance of M23 forces continued unabated. Village after village in the Uvira highlands fell under rebel control, and defections from local militias further undermined an already fragile defence. Burundi Steps In In a bid to stem the rebel tide, Burundi—an ally of Kinshasa—deployed troops across the Ruizi River into Luvungi. However, the intervention has only added to the uncertainty: questions remain about the ability of these reinforcements to halt the M23 advance amid persistent suspicions of covert support from Rwanda. The situation on the ground remains volatile, with the ultimate outcome still unknown. A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis As the fighting intensifies, the humanitarian situation worsens. Hospitals are overwhelmed by the influx of wounded, while markets, pharmacies, and banks remain shuttered. Civilians left in the lurch find themselves trapped in a desperate struggle between fleeing and merely trying to survive, with scant help or hope of escape. The Noose Tightens By April 2025, anxiety in the region had reached a fever pitch. In a massive redeployment along the Bukavu–Uvira axis observed between April 11 and 16, M23/AFC forces appear to be gearing up for the capture of Uvira, with a potential further push toward Kalemie on the horizon. This military buildup is fanning widespread fear among the population, especially in light of past abuses in rebel-controlled areas and comes despite diplomatic efforts aimed at averting an outright occupation of the city. A Fragile Glimmer of Diplomacy Amid the carnage, a slender thread of hope has emerged through diplomatic channels. Peace talks, brokered by Qatar, began early in April with an initial session on the 7th and a follow-up scheduled for the 9th. Yet on the ground, the disconnect remains palpable—as fighting persists unabated and ceasefire promises are repeatedly broken. Uvira: A Symbol of Endless Conflict Once a thriving urban centre, Uvira now stands on the brink. Besieged by relentless M23 attacks, fragmented FARDC counterattacks, internal divisions, and regional power plays, the city has become a stark symbol of eastern Congo’s enduring tragedy. Civilians bear the ultimate cost of this unyielding conflict. With only around 6,000 Wazalendo fighters still defending Uvira, a desperate appeal has been made to President Tshisekedi for additional ammunition and supplies. Recent clashes, which claimed at least 17 Burundian soldiers in Rugezi, underscore the grim reality: Uvira is now squarely in the rebels’ sights, its future uncertain, and its people paying the highest price for an endless war.
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